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December 20071 Introduction
There is a common perception that the gains from trade are larger than what quantitative
general-equilibrium models of trade can explain. A recurring goal in the trade literature has
been to ￿nd new channels through which such models could generate larger gains from trade.
A prominent example is Romer (1994), where trade allows for the consumption of a higher
variety of goods, and this generates additional bene￿ts not included in standard calculations.
Romer￿ s argument is that, in the presence of ￿xed marketing or distribution costs, a su¢ ciently
high tari⁄may imply not just lower imports, but no imports at all of a good. The result would
be less variety in available consumer goods and less availability of specialized equipment and
intermediate goods.
We start in section 2 by showing that the connection postulated by Romer between trade
liberalization and increasing variety is present in the data by focusing on the experience of Costa
Rica from 1986 to 1992. During this period, the average tari⁄ on consumer (intermediate)
goods fell from 48.8% to 22.5% (11.2% to 10%) and the variety of consumer (intermediate)
goods imported increased by 25.6% (14.7%). Romer performed a numerical exercise to show
that the welfare losses arising from reduced variety may be an order of magnitude larger than
those associated with the standard trade analysis (the Harberger Triangles). In section 3 we
use our Costa Rican data to evaluate this result by applying a method introduced by Feenstra
(1994) to compute the gains from increased imported variety. For consumer goods we ￿nd gains
of around 0.3% in spite of the much larger increase in variety, while for intermediate goods we
￿nd no gains at all. The relatively low welfare gains arise because of strong heterogeneity across
imported goods, which implies that, upon trade liberalization, the new varieties are imported
in small quantities and hence contribute little to welfare. We refer to this e⁄ect, not taken into
account by Romer (1994) nor some of his followers (Rutherford and Tarr, 2002), as the e⁄ect
of "curvature" in weakening the variety gains from trade. In section 4 we relate this result to
recent models of ￿rm-level heterogeneity and derive a simple formula that shows the e⁄ect of
curvature.
The reader may ￿nd it surprising that we ￿nd small variety gains from trade liberalization
in Costa Rica given that Broda and Weinstein (2006) ￿nd large gains from imported variety
for the U.S. But the two exercises are very di⁄erent. Broda and Weinstein (2006) quantify
the gains from the introduction of new varieties in the rest of the world that are eventually
1imported into the United States. This is very di⁄erent from the e⁄ects of trade liberalization
because, whereas an expansion of imported variety responding to trade liberalization entails
consuming less desirable varieties (that￿ s why they weren￿ t imported before), an expansion of
imported variety in time is more likely to be associated with the introduction of important
(infra-marginal) varieties abroad which are more likely to contribute signi￿cantly to welfare.
These results do no take into account the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on domestic variety.
But it seems reasonable to think that an increase in import competition would cause a decline
in domestic variety as domestic ￿rms exit. In fact, the evidence reveals that trade liberaliza-
tion leads to exit by domestic ￿rms (Tybout, 2003). Consistent with this, domestic variety
is endogenous in most recent models and falls with a decline in trade costs.1 In section 5 we
present a model with ￿rm-level increasing returns, di⁄erentiated goods, monopolistic competi-
tion, endogenous variety and free entry to show that, as in Baldwin and Forslid (2004), total
variety (domestic plus imported) can either increase, decrease or remain constant with trade
liberalization. More importantly and surprisingly, the gains from trade do not depend on what
happens to total variety.
More generally, we ￿nd that the real wage is ultimately dependent on the ratio of imports
to total expenditure with an elasticity that is the same across a range of models. This result
is also relevant in relation to the notion that trade leads to a reallocation of economic activity
towards ￿rms with higher productivity (Melitz, 2003, Bernard et. al., 2003), and that this
"provides a non-traditional source of welfare gains from trade" (Bernard et. al., 2007 - JEP
paper). We argue that, conditional on the estimated elasticities of trade with respect to trade
costs, the implications of models with increasing returns, endogenous variety, free or restricted
entry, and heterogeneity across ￿rms have exactly the same implications for welfare gains from
trade liberalization as traditional models.2 In our view, the contribution of the new trade
models is not to provide new channels for gains from trade, but rather to explain the levels and
microfoundations of trade that we observe.
1See Melitz (2003), Chaney (2007), Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2007), and Arkolakis (2006).
2This assertion is valid under the standard assumption that productivities are distributed Pareto, but may
not be valid under alternative distributions.
22 Variety and Tari⁄s in Costa Rica
Our dataset consists of Costa Rican imports of each of 1,338 products from up to 111 countries
over 1986 to 1992. The product categories correspond to the NAUCA II classi￿cation used
by Central American countries over this period. This classi￿cation does not conform to the
more widely used SITC. In terms of the number of categories the NAUCA II level of detail
corresponds to 5 digit categories in the SITC. We have data on kilos and US dollars of imports
(c.i.f.) for each product-country-year. Our source for this data is the Central Bank of Costa
Rica, which in this period applied a tari⁄ (called sobretasas) to these imports, with the rate
varying over time and across products. From the Costa Rican Finance Ministry we obtained
data on Costa Rica￿ s second tari⁄(called tarifa), which likewise varies across time and products.
Our sample is bracketed by 1986 and 1992 since Costa Rica used di⁄erent product classi￿cation
systems before and after these years.
We take country of origin as the demarcation of a variety (i.e., cars from the US are a
di⁄erent variety than cars from Germany or Japan) and think of total variety for a good as
the number of countries from which there were imports in a product category.3 (The model we
present in Section 5 interprets variety in the more traditional sense of monopolistic competition
and product di⁄erentiation, where variety corresponds to the number of ￿rms that sell in a
market.)
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the dataset. Variety rose from an average of
8.2 in a category in 1986 to 11.5 in 1992 for the 369 consumer goods, and from 7.9 to 8.8 for
the 969 intermediate and capital goods (hereafter just intermediate goods). Weighting each
product category by total dollar imports, variety rose from 19.1 to 24 for consumer goods, and
from 13.6 to 15.6 for intermediate goods. Over this period average tari⁄s fell from 48.8% to
22.5% for consumer goods, and from 17.1% to 12.9% for intermediate goods.4 Dollar-weighted
tari⁄s fell from 43.3% to 20.3% for consumer goods, and from 11.2% to 10.0% for intermediate
goods. Consumption goods imports rose from 5.4% of GDP in 1986 to 8.1% in 1992. The share
of intermediate goods imports rose from 23.3% to 27.2% of GDP over the same period.
Of course, these aggregate trends do not establish that tari⁄ reduction, as opposed to some
other factor (such as income and population growth), caused the increases observed in variety
3See Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (1997) for a discussion of the limitations of this measure of variety.
4The standard deviation of tari⁄ rates also fell sharply, from 37% to 12% for consumer goods, and from 17%
to 7% for intermediate goods.
3and import shares. Evidence that variety increased in product-years with bigger tari⁄reductions
would be more compelling. Before examining the micro evidence on tari⁄s and variety, however,
it is useful to examine the underlying premise that greater market size boosts variety, as implied
by ￿xed costs of importing a given product from a given country. Table 2 presents the results
from regressing variety on market size for consumer and intermediate goods, respectively. Each
observation is a product-year, e.g. cars in 1990. The dependent variable is the natural log of
variety, while the independent variable is the natural log of market size (imports of a product
summed across all countries in a year). Year e⁄ects are included to deal with general in￿ ation
in dollar imports. The results show that variety is greater in larger markets, both for consumer
and intermediate goods. The relationship is statistically and economically signi￿cant: a 1%
bigger market has 0.26% more variety on average (standard errors around 0.004%). The R20s
indicate that almost half the variation in variety across products is associated with market size.
Instead of larger markets pulling in more varieties due to ￿xed costs, an alternative intepretation
of this result is that some product categories are arbitrarily broader than others. Exogenously
larger categories could include more countries just because they are more aggregated. To see
if the results owe entirely to cross-sectional variation in product size, we regressed variety on
size controlling for product dummies. These results are also reported in Table 2. The size of
the elasticity is roughly halved to 0.12, but it remains economically and statistically signi￿cant
(standard errors around 0.006). 5 The fact that the elasticity of variety with respect to market
size is well below one, however, implies either that ￿xed costs are increasing in market size (albeit
less than proportionately) or ever-less-important varieties are imported by bigger markets.
Measuring market size as country GDP, Hummels and Klenow (2002) similarly found a
strong relationship between market size and import variety. For 6-digit categories they found
that larger economies imported proportionately more, and a doubling of importer size was
associated with importing from about 28% more countries. As within Costa Rica, bigger
markets seemed to import ￿smaller￿varieties, as the new varieties accounted for only 19% of
the additional imports of larger economies. Similarly, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2007),
henceforth EKK, document that more French ￿rms (including those that have small sales in
5Measuring market size as country GDP, Hummels and Klenow (2002) similarly found a strong relationship
between market size and import variety. They looked at a set of 59 countries importing from 115 countries across
5,000 6-digit categories in 1995. Larger economies imported proportionately more, and a doubling of importer
size was associated with importing from about 28% more countries within 6-digit categories. As within Costa
Rica, bigger markets seemed to import ￿smaller￿varieties, as the new varieties accounted for only 19% of the
additional imports of larger economies.
4France) export to larger economies, consistent with models with ￿xed costs of entry and with
the idea that larger economies pull in less valuable varieties on the margin.
With some con￿dence that market size a⁄ects variety, we examined whether products with
falling tari⁄s see rising variety. Our identifying assumption is that product di⁄erences in tari⁄
changes are exogenous. Table 3 presents the results from regressing the natural log of variety
on the natural log of the gross tari⁄ rate. Including year and product dummies, we ￿nd an
economically and statistically signi￿cant negative association between variety and tari⁄s, with
a 1% higher tari⁄ rate going along with 0.82% less consumer import variety and 0.29% less
intermediate import variety (standard errors around 0.10%). Consistent with the hypothesis
that higher tari⁄s reduce variety by shrinking the market, Table 3 also reports that a 1% higher
tari⁄ lower total imports by 1.83% in consumer product categories and 0.54% in intermediate
categories (standard errors of 0.29%).6
The association between available varieties and trade has been studied for other trade lib-
eralization episodes. Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) ￿nd that varieties that accounted for only 10
percent of trade before liberalization may account for as much as 40 percent of trade following
liberalization. While this ￿nding indicates substantial adjustments in the extensive margin, fur-
ther investigation reveals that new varieties are typically associated with small sales. Arkolakis
(2006) ￿nds that while the total number of 6-digit (Harmonized-System) varieties that were
imported by the U.S. from Mexico increases substantially with NAFTA (at least 30% depending
on di⁄erent de￿nitions) the contribution of these goods to new trade is roughly 5%. This is also
consistent with the ￿ndings of Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout (2007) for Colombian ￿rms.
They ￿nd that ￿rms that were not exporting the previous year into an destination market have
typically very small sales there.
3 Variety Gains in Costa Rica
Feenstra (1994) shows how to adjust the standard import price index for changing variety,
including our case where marginal varieties appear less important than inframarginal ones. We
refer to this adjustment as the Feenstra Ratio and denote it by F, with
F =
￿P
￿0 v0
i=
P
￿0\￿ v0
i P
￿ vi=
P
￿0\￿ vi
￿￿1=(￿￿1)
6Related, Arkolakis (2006) showed that U.S. tari⁄ declines associated with NAFTA led to an increase in
imported variety from Mexico, but that the new goods were imported in relatively small quantities.
5Here vi are imports from country-product pair i in 1986 and ￿ is the set of country-product
pairs imported in 1986, and the corresponding values with primes refer to 1992. Table 4 has the
ingredients of the Feenstra Ratio as well as the ratio itself. The ￿rst row says that current dollar
imports grew by a factor of 2.87 for consumer goods and 1.90 for intermediate goods from 1986
to 1992. But the next row indicates that imports grew almost as much for ￿common￿country-
product pairs (those with imports in both 1986 and 1992): by a factor of 2.83 for consumer
goods and 1.90 for intermediate goods. The following row says that consumer imports grew
1.4% faster than for common country-product pairs, whereas all intermediate imports grew at
the same rate as for common pairs. For the Feenstra Ratios we use ￿ = 6 based on estimates
in Broda and Weinstein (2006) for levels of aggregation that bracket the level of aggregation in
the Costa Rican product categories. Using this value the Feenstra Ratio is 0.997 for consumer
goods and 1 for intermediates, suggesting a very modest downward adjustment of 0.3% to the
price index for consumer imports, and none at all for intermediates.
How can we reconcile such modest adjustments with the surge in variety of about 25% for
consumer goods (from 19.1 to 24 in Table 1) and 15% for intermediate goods (from 13.6 to
15.6)? The answer is that the new varieties must not be as important as incumbent ones. For
example, adding South Korea as a source of cars may not be as important as already having
access to cars from Japan, the U.S., and Germany.
4 The role of curvature
Consider a continuum of foreign varieties indexed by s and ordered in terms of decreasing
quality or increasing marginal cost. With CES preferences and an elasticity of substitution
￿ > 1, there will be some n such that all varieties s 2 [0;n] are imported. This n will be lower
than total foreign variety if importing entails a ￿xed cost. Consider an increase in imported
variety from n to n0. The Feenstra Ratio in this case would be
F =
 R n0
0 v(s)ds
R n
0 v(s)ds
!￿1=(￿￿1)
Taking the log derivative of this with respect to n0 we see that
@ lnF
@ lnn0 = ￿
1
￿ ￿ 1
 
v(n0)
(1=n0)
R n0
0 v(s)ds
!
(1)
6The ￿rst term is the standard elasticity of welfare with respect to variety (love of variety) under
CES preferences. The second is an adjustment for "curvature." A low value for this term implies
that marginal varieties have either low quality or preference parameters, or a high international
price, so the gains from increased variety are smaller.
A nice expression for this curvature adjustment can be obtained if we assume that the
preference parameter, quality, or productivity is distributed Pareto. Under the productivity
interpretation and with monopolistic competition, domestic prices of foreign varieties will be
proportional to the inverse of productivity, ￿, and v(s) will be proportional to ￿(s)￿￿1, v(s) =
A￿(s)￿￿1 for some A > 0. Assume that there is a continuum of goods with exogenous measure
M whose international price is drawn from a Pareto distribution, so that Pr(￿ < e ￿) = G(e ￿) ￿
1￿(b=e ￿)￿ for e ￿ ￿ b > 0. We assume that ￿ > ￿￿1. Note for future reference that an increase in
￿ implies less dispersion, in that more and more of the productivities are closer to the minimum
b. If the ￿xed importing cost is the same across varieties, then pro￿ts will be increasing in
productivity ￿,and there will be a ￿
￿ such that all inputs with ￿ > ￿
￿ are imported. Imported
variety is then n = M ￿ Pr(￿ > ￿
￿) and hence
Z n
0
v(s)ds =
Z 1
￿￿
v(￿)
dG(￿)
1 ￿ G(￿
￿)
=
An￿(’￿)
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Plugging into (1) we get:
" ￿ ￿
@ lnF
@ lnn
=
1
￿ ￿ 1
￿
1
￿
(2)
Note that high curvature (low ￿) decreases the impact of love of variety.7
As mentioned in section 2, in Costa Rica the mean (weighted) variety for consumer goods
went from 19.1 in 1986 to 24 in 1992, a increase of 25:6%. Given the result in the previous
section that the Feenstra Ratio for this period is 0:997 (a welfare gain of 0:3% thanks to
increased variety for ￿ = 6), we have that 0:256 ￿ " = 0:003. Using the expression in (2) for "
and ￿ = 6, this implies that ￿ = 5:3.
For comparison, EKK use data on exports and domestic sales by French ￿rms to estimate
that ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) = 1:5. If ￿ = 6 this means ￿ = 7:5, just a bit lower than the central value for
￿ (i.e., ￿ = 8) in Eaton and Kortum (2002). The Costa Rican experience suggests somewhat
higher curvature than this. This di⁄erence matters for the welfare implications of the observed
7This result does not depend on the implicit assumption that there is a unique ￿xed cost for all foreign
varieties. In separate work we have established that if the ￿xed cost is distributed Pareto and is independent of
￿ then this result remain valid.
7increase in variety in Costa Rica. If instead of ￿ = 5:3 we used the lower curvature associated
with ￿ = 7:5, then " = 0:067, and the variety gains would be 1:7% rather than our 0:3%. Of
course, this di⁄erence could be due to the fact that in the Costa Rican data we are interpreting
variety with country of origin, whereas in EKK variety is associated with the number of ￿rms
that serve a particular market.
5 Endogenous Domestic Variety and Free Entry
The previous discussion has taken foreign variety to be exogenous and simply performed a
comparative statics exercise with respecto to variety. We also ignored any e⁄ects of trade
liberalization on the variety of goods o⁄ered by domestic ￿rms. What happens to total available
variety (domestic plus foreign) following trade liberalization?8 Baldwin and Forslid (2004)
address this question through a modi￿ed Melitz (2003) model with two asymmetric countries
under exogenous wages. They show that if the ￿xed cost of supplying the home market is higher
for foreign than for domestic ￿rms, then total available variety falls with a decline in the costs
of trade. They refer to this as the "anti-variety e⁄ect" of trade liberalization. Here we present
a model with endogenous wages and N > 2 countries to generalize the Baldwin and Forslid
(2004) and, more importantly, to show that conditional on the e⁄ect of trade liberalization in
imports, all major quantitative models of trade deliver the same gains.9
As above, there is a continuum of goods and preferences are CES with an elasticity of
substitution ￿ > 1. We denote the exporting country by i and the importing country by
j, where i;j = 1;:::;N. Given a measure of Lj representative consumers in country j, the
demand for a ￿rm with productivity ￿ from country i charging a price pij (￿) in country j is
xij (￿) = pij (￿)
￿￿ P
￿￿1
j wjLj ,where wj is the wage and Pj is the price index.10 Each ￿rm must
pay a ￿xed cost (in terms of labor in the destination country) to enter a particular market
that varies across country pairs, fij, and also incurs iceberg transportation costs ￿ij > 1 with
8Demidova and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2007) study the optimal trade policy in a setting where domestic and
foreign variety are endogenous for the case of a small country.
9One drawback of the model we present here is that we treat tari⁄s as transportation costs, meaning that we
don￿ t deal with the way in which the associated revenues feed back into the demand for goods. For the points
we make here, however, this is not problematic. For welfare analysis modelling tari⁄s explicitly is essential (see
Demidova and Rodr￿guez-Clare, 2007).
10The price index is Pj, where P
1￿￿
j =
P
￿
R 1
0 pij (￿)
1￿￿ Mij￿ij (￿)d￿, ￿ij (￿) is the distribution of produc-
tivities of ￿rms originating from country i conditional on selling to country j and Mij is the measure of ￿rms
from country i selling to country j.
8￿ii = 1. Firms from i with ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
ij will export to market j. The cut-o⁄ productivities ￿
￿
ij are
determined by equating maximum pro￿ts to zero. This yields
￿
￿
￿
ij
￿￿￿1 =
fij
￿
￿
￿￿1￿ijwi
￿1￿￿ 1
￿
Lj
P1￿￿
j
. (3)
Firms have to pay a ￿xed entry cost, fe, in order to enter the market and draw a productivity
realization. New entrants draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution, as above.11 If a
￿rm gets a productivity draw below ￿
￿
ii, it exits immediately without operating. Thus, because
of free entry, in equilibrium, expected pro￿ts of a ￿rm must equal to entry costs.12 In other
words, the product of the probability of getting a productivity draw above ￿
￿
ii and the average
pro￿ts must equal the entry cost. The free entry condition together with the labor market
clearing condition implies that the equilibrium number of ￿rms producing in country i is
Ni =
(￿ ￿ 1)b￿
i=(￿
￿
ii)
￿
￿￿fe
Li . (4)
Notice that total export sales from country i to j are:
Tij =
￿
￿
￿
ii
￿
￿
ij
￿￿
Ni
| {z }
￿rms
wjfij
￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1 | {z }
average sales of operating ￿rms
. (5)
De￿ne the fraction of total income of country j spent on goods from country i by ￿ij. Using
the de￿nition of total sales from i to j and equation (4) we have:
￿ij =
Lib￿
i (￿ijwi)
￿￿ f
1￿￿=(￿￿1)
ij
P
￿ L￿b￿
￿ (￿￿jw￿)
￿￿ f
1￿￿=(￿￿1)
￿j
. (6)
It is quite remarkable that, even with free entry, the equation determining market shares,
(6), turns out to be quite similar to the one introduced by Eaton and Kortum (2002). In
particular, market share appears to be changing in the same elasticity with respect to the cost
11We assume that the parameters of the model are such that the lower productivity threshold ￿
￿
ij > ￿
￿
ii > bi,
8i 6= j.
12Essentially, we assume that there exists a perfect capital market which requires ￿rms to pay a ￿xed entry
cost before drawing a productivity realization. Consequently, we multiply the LHS by 1 ￿ G(￿
￿
ii;bi), the
probability of obtaining the average pro￿t, since ￿rms with pro￿ts below this average necessarily exit the
market. Alternatively, we could have to speci￿ed a more general case of an in￿nite horizon model with an
exogenous probability of death for each ￿rm, ￿, as in Melitz (2003). In this case the expected pro￿ts from entry
should equal the discounted entry cost, in equilibrium.
9factors, ￿ij and wi. In fact, it is worth noticing that this expression is identical to that of Chaney
(2007), who does not assume free entry, but a predetermined number of potential suppliers.13
Using equation (5) and the de￿nition of ￿ij that implies Tij = ￿ijwjLj, it follows that the
measure of ￿rms from country i selling to j, Mij, can be written as:
Mij = ￿ij
Lj
fij
￿￿
￿￿￿+1
.
Thus, total varieties o⁄ered in country j are given by:
X
￿
M￿j =
Lj
fjj
￿￿
￿￿￿+1
+
Lj
￿￿
￿￿￿+1
X
￿6=i
￿￿j
￿
1
f￿j
￿
1
fjj
￿
This is a generalization of the Baldwin and Forslid (2004) result. In particular, increasing any
￿￿j (trade liberalization) has an anti-variety e⁄ect i⁄ f￿j > fjj, 8￿.14 Intuitively, if f￿j > fjj
then the marginal variety from country ￿ entails a lower price than the marginal domestic
variety, so for each new foreign variety more than one domestic variety is displaced.
In this class of models, welfare for each representative consumer is given by Cj = wj=Pj
,which does not depend on the assumption of free entry. Using (3) and (6) we can express real
wages as
wj
Pj
= ￿
￿1=￿
jj L
1=(￿￿1)
j
 
b￿
jf
1￿￿=(￿￿1)
jj
fe
￿
￿
￿￿1
￿￿ (￿)
￿=(￿￿1)
￿ ￿ 1
￿ ￿ ￿ + 1
!1=￿
.
Consider ￿rst a closed economy, with ￿jj = 1. A larger population increases welfare with
an elasticity of 1=(￿ ￿ 1). This is the standard result in models with love of variety and
no heterogeneity, but di⁄ers from the results in Chaney (2007), EKK, and Arkolakis (2006),
where this elasticity is 1=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1=￿. The reason why curvature does not a⁄ect the gains
from size in our set-up is that the number of goods (Nj) produced by an economy increases
proportionately with Lj. Thus, contrary to models with no free entry, consumers in a country
with larger population are not forced to consume varieties produced with lower productivities.
On the other hand, a decline in the ￿xed cost of operation, fjj, increases welfare with elasticity
1=(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1=￿. Here we see how curvature decreases the variety gains associated with love
13Chaney (2007) essentially dispenses of the free entry condition this way. In his model some ￿rms may still
not operate since they have low productivity.
14Notice that the analysis in this section does not depend on the assumptions of free entry and symmetry
across countries, but only on Dixit Stiglitz demand, CRS production technology and Pareto distribution of
productivities.
10of variety. A decline in fe, on the other hand, increases welfare with elasticity 1=￿ - higher
curvature entails a higher elasticity. The reason for this is that a lower fe leads to more entry
while the number of operating ￿rms remains the same. This entails more selection, the bene￿ts
of which are increasing with heterogeneity, or 1=￿.
Trade costs, ￿ij, and marketing costs, fij, a⁄ect real wages only indirectly through ￿jj.
Thus, we can think of the welfare e⁄ects of trade liberalization as a reduction in ￿jj. In fact, in
a proper calibration exercise, looking at the e⁄ects of trade liberalization involves matching ￿jj
before and after the trade liberalization. In this model, ￿jj in￿ uences welfare with an elasticity
of ￿1=￿, exactly the same way as in Eaton and Kortum￿ s (2002) model of pure Ricardian
trade (with no variety) and also the same as in Chaney (2007) and Arkolakis (2006). It is
important to note that this happens even if fij 6= fjj, so that changes in ￿jj do a⁄ect total
variety. To understand this, consider the case with fij < fjj, so that an increase in ￿ij (with
a corresponding decline in ￿jj) increases total variety. Given fij < fjj, the varieties that enter
from abroad have prices that are higher than the domestic ones that are displaced, and it turns
out that this exactly compensates the gains associated with increased variety.
This result implies that, conditional on the change in ￿jj and given a value for ￿, a model
with monopolistic competition, free entry and endogenous variety, delivers the same gains from
trade liberalization as a same model with no free entry (Chaney 2007 or Arkolakis 2006) and
a Ricardian trade model (Eaton and Kortum, 2002).15 The broader implication is that given
the estimated elasticities of trade ￿ ows with respect to trade costs, the volume of trade itself
determines the associated gains. Contrary to what many have claimed, new trade models don￿ t
really o⁄er new gains from trade, but do allow us to better understand the levels and patterns
of trade that we observe.
15It can also be shown that in Krugman￿ s (1980) model of trade, where varieties are homogenous and there
are no ￿xed costs of trade (so variety is the same in all countries), the gains from trade are proportional to
￿
￿1=(￿￿1)
ii . Again, conditional on the change in ￿ii, and noting that the relevant elasticity estimated in this
model is ￿ ￿ 1 rather than ￿, then the gains from trade are the same.
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12Table 1 
Mean Tariffs and Variety in 1986 and 1992 in Costa Rica 
 
        
   Consumer    Intermediate 
            
   1986  1992    1986  1992 
            
 Mean  Tariff  48.8  22.5    17.1  12.9 
Unweighted            
 Mean  Variety  8.2  11.5    7.9 8.8 
          
          
 Mean  Tariff  43.3  20.3    11.2 10.0 
Weighted           
 Mean  Variety  19.1  24.0    13.6 15.6 
          
          
 Import  Share  5.4  8.1    23.3  27.2 
          
 
 
Table 2 
The Impact of Market Size on Variety 
 
  
Consumer 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
Market Size 
 
0.264 
(0.005) 
0.121 
(0.008) 
0.257 
(0.003) 
0.121 
(0.004) 
     
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product dummies  No  Yes  No  Yes 
     
2 R   0.479 0.883 0.465 0.882 
     
# observations  2,583  6,783 
     
  
 
Table 3 
The Impact of Tariffs on Variety and Market Size 
 
  
Consumer 
 
 
Intermediate 
 
     Variety  Market Size  Variety  Market Size 
     
 
Tariffs 
−0.818 
   (0.111) 
−1.832 
   (0.291) 
−0.289 
   (0.102) 
−0.540 
   (0.291) 
     
2 R      0.873     0.873    0.867    0.847 
     
# observations  2,583  6,783 
     
 
 
Table 4 
Feenstra Ratios 
 
    
[1992 Imports / 1986 Imports]  Consumer 
 
Intermediate 
 
    
All country-product pairs  2.869  1.904 
    
Common country-product pairs  2.829  1.904 
    
All / Common  1.014  1.000 
    
Feenstra Ratio with σ = 6  0.997 1.000 
    
 
 